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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Corruption can occur at several levels of government. Our interest is on factors that determine the
pattern of corruption at the local government level. In this paper, we model a situation where a central
government determines both the income tax rate and the share of tax revenue between the central
government and the local governments, while the local governments seek to maximize their own private
beneﬁts, by engaging in two classes of activities. The ﬁrst one consists of providing public goods to
local private ﬁrms, because these public goods help the ﬁrms to make more proﬁt, thus enlarging the
tax base. The second one consists of extortionary activities, such as charging fees, protection money,
etc., on local ﬁrms. We assume that either these extortionary activities escape the notice of the central
government, or the latter is aware of them but does not have su!cient evidence to prosecute corrupt
local government o!cials. The two classes of activities mentioned above may be called respectively the
helping hand activities and the grabbing hand activities.
Olson (1993, 2000) distinguishes two types of bandits that correspond to the helping hand and the
grabbing hand behaviour. A roving bandit seeks new preys and has no interest in the future development
of the current preys. He wants to grabb as much as possible. A stationary bandit, on the other hand,
cares about the future prosperity of the current preys, and this is the reason for the helping hand
behaviour to co-exist with the grabbing hand behaviour1. Our view of corrupt local governments is
that they exhibit both types of behaviour. Whether a local government puts more emphasis on the
helping hand or on the grabbing hand depends on (a) the revenue share that the central government
allows it to have, (b) the cost of hiding extortionary activities from the central government, and (c) the
discount rate.
One may expect that when the central government raises its share of tax revenue, the local govern-
ment may respond by reducing the level of its helping hand activities, and intensiﬁes its grabbing hand
activities.The long-term consequence of this shift of balance is a decrease in the tax base. Thus, the
tax revenue of the central government, expressed as a function of the its tax share, has the inverted U
shaped. Such an outcome would be consistent with the view underlying the Laer curve.
Our dynamic model contains several additional interesting results, especially those relating to growth
and stagnation. First, there are two stationary equilibria. One of these (with a smaller steady state
capital stock) has the saddlepoint stability property. The other stationary equilibrium (with a greater
level of capital stock) is completely unstable. Second, a permanent increase in the central government’s
1A related phenomenon is the optimal feeding of slaves, see Rees et al. (2003) for theory and empirical evidence.
3tax share will reduce the (stable) steady state capital stock, because it discourages the helping hand.
The grabbing hand activity level increases initially, but eventually falls, because the new steady state
stock is lower. Third, if the initial capital stock is below the unstable steady state stock, the optimal
policy is to converge to the (lower) stable steady state stock, but if the initial capital stock exceeds the
unstable steady state stock, it will be optimal to keep the grabbing activity level constant and increase
the helping activity level steadily, causing the capital stock, and income, to increase without bound.
The unstable steady state stock can be shown to be an increasing function of the central government ’s
tax share imposed by the central government, and a decreasing function of the degree of transparency
of local government activities. It follows that, given any initial capital stock, there is a corresponding
threshold level of central government tax share, with the property that if the tax share is higher than this
threshold level, the economy starting with this initial stock will stagnate, and if the tax share is below
the threshold level, the economy will achieve positive growth for ever. Similarly, given the initial capital
stock, there is a threshold level of transparency of governance, i.e., the di!culty of hiding corruption.
If the transparency is below the threshold level, the economy will stagnate, and if the transparency is
greater than the threshold level, the economy will achieve positive growth for ever.
There are static models that address issues relating to self-serving local governments. Keen and Kot-
sogianis (2003) developed a model where the central government and the local governments compete in
taxation. A section of their paper deals with the case where the central government is a Stackelberg
leader. Chen (2003) examines the recentralization of tax in China, and argues that the central gov-
ernment of China did not take into account the possibility that an increase in central tax share may
encourage the grabbing hand behaviour of local governments. However, unlike our dynamic model,
those papers, being set in a static framework, cannot deal with issues such as perpetual growth versus
stagnation.
The general topic of government corruption has been studied by many authors, but typically they
use a static framework2. Dynamic analyses of corruption include the work of Tornell and Velasco (1992),
and Tornell and Lane (1999). These papers do not deal with taxation issues3, nor with revenue sharing
2The view that policy makers are revenue-maximizing Leviathans has been forcefully expressed by many authors, see
in particular Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1980). More recent works include Basu et al. (1992), Schleifer and Vishny
(1993), Mauro (1995), Frye and Schleifer (1997), Acemoglu and Verdier (2002), Ades and Di Tella (2002), Ni and Pham
(2003).
3There is a large literature that deals with taxation issues in a dynamic framework. See, for example, Kemp et al. (1993),
Long and Shimomura (2002), and references cited therein. However, these authors typically assume that governments are
benevolent bodies rather than Leviathans.
4between the central government and the local government, nor with transparency of governance.
We begin our analysis with a static model, presented in Section 2. Our main contribution is the
dynamic model, presented in Sections 3 to 7. Some concluding remarks are oered in Section 8.
2A s t a t i c m o d e l
In this section, a static model of tax sharing and local government corruption is presented. We assume
there are no interactions among local governments, so that, without loss of generality, we focus on the
case where there are only two governments: a central government and a local government. The static
setting can be interpreted as the situation where the local government acts as a roving bandit. The local
government has only one shot at extracting as much as possible from the ﬁrms, and it is not concerned
with the capital accumulation and the associated future beneﬁts.
Let the local ﬁrms have the aggregate production function \ (k>N),w h e r ek is the ﬂow of productivity-
enhancing public goods provided by the local government, and NA0 is the aggregate stock of capital.
We assume production function is strictlty concave and increasing in each argument, with
\kN A 0,a n d lim
k<0
\k(k>N)=4
The local government takes as given the tax rate ﬁrms face, which is denoted by y, and the revenue
share between itself and the central government, 1   and , respectively. We assume 0 ?y?1 and
0    1.
The local government, in addition to providing useful public goods, can extort money from the
local ﬁrms through a costly process. Let j  0 denote the amount of money extorted. Let the local
government’s cost of extortion be represented by F(j). This cost includes the eort cost as well as the
cost of covering up to avoid audits by the central government. We assume that F(0) = 0, F0(j) A 0,
F0(0) ? 1 and F00(j) A 0. The assumption 0  F0(0) ? 1 implies that the level of grabbing will always
be positive.
The objective of the local government is to maximize its private net beneﬁts:
max
j>k
E  (1  )y\(k>N)  k + j  F(j) (1)
subject to
(1  y)\ (k>N)  j  0 (2)
5k  0 and j  0= (3)
The constraint (2) states that the amount extorted cannot exceed the local ﬁrms’ after-tax income.
The inequalities (2) and (3) deﬁne a feasible set V which is a convex and non-empty subset of U2 :
V = {(k>j)  (0>0) : j  (1  y)\ (k>N)}
If we represent the set V in the space (k>j)  (0>0),w h e r ek is measured along the horizontal axis, and
j along the vertical axis, we can see that the upper boundary of this set is the curve
j =( 1 y)\ (k>N)
which is has the concave shape. Since the set V has an interior, the Slater condition holds.
The Lagrangian function is:
O =( 1 )y\(k>N)  k + j  F(j)+1((1  y)\ (k>N)  j)+2j + 3k
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
CO
Ck
=( 1 )y\k  1+1(1  y)\k + 3 =0 (4)
CO
Cj
=1 F0(j)  1 + 2 =0 (5)
1  0, (1  y)\ (k>N)  j  0 and 1[(1  y)\ (k>N)  j]=0 (6)
2  0, j  0 and 2j =0
3  0, k  0 and 3k =0 =
Since the objective function is strictly concave, and the constraints are concave in (k>j), the necessary
conditions yield a unique global maximum. We now show that this unique solution (kW>jW) may be in
the interior of the feasible set V, or may be at the upper boundary of this set, i.e., a point on the curve
j =( 1 y)\ (k>N).
First let us establish that, if ?1 and NA0, then at the optimum, kW A 0 and jW A 0. For suppose
kW =0 . Then equation (4) would yield
[(1  )y + 1(1  y)]4 + 3 =1
which is not possible. It follows that kW must be positive. Now suppose that jW =0 .T h e n (1 
y)\ (kW>N)  jW =( 1 y)\ (kW>N) A 0, and hence 1 =0 . Substituting this result into equation (5)
6we get 1 F0(0) + 2 =0which yields F0(0) = 1 + 2  1. This is not possible because by assumption
F0(0) ? 1. It follows that jW must be positive.
Lemma S1:A tt h eo p t i m u m ,2 = 3 =0provided ?1.I f =1 ,t h e nkW =0 .
We conclude that if ?1,t h eo p t i m a lp o i n t(kW>jW) must be either an interior point of the feasible
set V, or a point on the boundary curve j =( 1 y)\ (k>N). (Note that on this curve, all the after-tax
proﬁts of local ﬁrms are appropriated by the local government by extortion.)
Case 1: Interior solution.
At an interior solution, all the Lagrange multipliers are zero, and we get
(1  )y\k(k>N)  1=0
1  F0(j)=0
Let b j be the unique value of j that satisﬁes 1  F0(b j)=0 ,t h a ti s
b j =( F0)31(1)





The pair (b k>b j) is the interior solution of problem (1) if and only if
(F0)31(1) ? (1  y)\ (b k(N>y>)>N) (8)
Comparative static results can be obtained by dierentiating equation (7) totally:
\kkgk + \kNgN = 
1























Thus we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition S1: If ?1 and condition (8) holds, the solution of the local government’s opti-
mization problem is an interior solution. In this case, small changes in the parameters y> and N do
7not aect the level of its grabbing activities. An increase in the central government’s tax share  will
reduce the level of the helping activities, while an increase in the capital stock N or in the tax rate y
will increase it.
It should be noted that since an increase in  will reduce b k,as u !ciently large increase in  will lead
to a violation of condition (8) and move the optimal solution to the upper boundary of the feasible set
V.( S i m i l a r l y ,as u !ciently large decrease in y or N may move the point b k(N>y>) to such an extent
that the optimal solution will be on the upper boundary of the feasible set.)
Case 2: Boundary solution.
If condition (8) fails to hold, then the solution occurs at the upper boundary of the feasible set V.
In this case, the solution must satisfy the following pair of equations




(1  y)\k =0 (9)
j =( 1 y)\ (k>N) (10)
Substituting (10) into (9) and rearranging we get,
©








\kk[(1  )y  (1  y)(1  F0(j))]  \ 2
k (1  y)2F00(j)
? 0







Proposition S2: Assume that ?1 and the central government tax share  is su!ciently large, or
N and y are su!ciently small, so that the local government’s optimal solution is on the upper boundary
of the feasible set. All the after-tax proﬁts of local ﬁrms are appropriated by the local government by
extortion. The level of helping hand activities declines with an increase in ,a n dt h ea m o u n tt ob e
extorted from the local ﬁrms also declines with .
To summarize, the helping hand k is discouraged by decreases in the share of taxes received by the
local government in both interior and corner solutions. The grabbing hand j is unaected by changes
8in  in interior solutions. In the case of a boundary solution, the actual corruption is constrained by
the total after-tax income of the ﬁrms, and an increase in  (and the associated decline in k) decreases
corruption in absolute value. But the proportion of after-tax income extracted illegally by the local
government remains at 100 percent in this case.
3 A dynamic model of growth and stagnation
3.1 Assumptions and notation
A major drawback of the static model is that it cannot address issues such as perpetual growth and
stagnation. In particular, static models cannot explain how a small change in parameter values (such
as the central government’s tax share, the local government’s corruption ability, the level of government
transparency) can turn a rapidly growing economy into a contracting economy. To deal with these
issues, we develop and analyze a simple dynamic extension of the static model.
The local ﬁrms have an aggregate capital stock N(w) at time w. This stock, together with the local
government spending on public goods k(w), yields a ﬂow of taxable income
\ (k(w)>N(w)) = k(w)N(w) where A0, A0 and  +   1 (11)
(In what follows, we often suppress the time argument for simplicity of notation.) The central gov-
ernment sets a constant tax rate y?1=Tax revenue is ykN. The central government’s share of this
revenue is ,a n d1   is the local government’s share.
The local government can also charge extortionary fees (of which the central government is vaguely
aware, but cannot provide evidence for prosecution). We denote by j(w) the total of these o-budget
revenues at time w.( H e r e ,t h es y m b o l sj and k stand for the grabbing hand and the helping hand,
respectively). The net beneﬁt received by the local government at time w is
U(w)=( 1 )yk(w)N(w)  k(w)+j(w)  F(j(w))
where F(j(w)) denote the eort cost of extortion.




j(w)2 where A0 and 1 A% 0
The parameters % and  are measures of the costliness of performing (and hiding the evidence of)
grabbing activities. (They may serve as proxies for the degree of transparency of local government
activities; for any increase in transparency would increase the costs of hiding extortion.)
9T h er a t eo fg r o w t ho ft h ec a p i t a ls t o c ki sa s s u m e dt ob e
˙ N(w)=v(1  y)k(w)N(w)  j(w) (12)
where v is the proportion of proﬁts that businessmen allocate to capital formation. We assume that the
extortion yields revenue only if the capital stock is positive. (When the capital stock is zero, extortion
is fruitless).




subject to the dierential equation (12), the non-negativity constraints j(w)  0, k(w)  0, the initial




Here u is the rate of discount, assumed to be positive.
3.2 The Optimal Control Problem of the Local Government
The current-value Hamiltonian is





v(1  y)k(w)N(w)  j(w)
i
For #(w)  0, the Hamiltonian is concave in the state and control variables. Thus any path
(#>N>j>k) that satisﬁes the necessary conditions and leads to a steady state (Nvv, #vv)  (0>0) is
an optimal path, provided #(w)  0 along that path4.
The necessary conditions consist of
(i) The maximality condition: the control variables must maximize K for given (N>#):
CK
Ck










(ii) The adjoint equation:
˙ # = u# 
CK
CN
= u#  kN31 [y(1  )+#v(1  y)] (15)
4The relevant su!ciency theorems are in Chapter 9 of Leonard and Long (1992).




= v(1  y)kN  j (16)
Let us deﬁne
] = ](#>)  y(1  )+#v(1  y) (17)






if ]  0 (18)
(and k =0if ]  0=) (We can expect that #A0 even in the case  =1 > because the stock yields
beneﬁts to the local government: grabbing is not possible if the stock is zero.). Henceforth, we focus on
the case ]A0.
Substituting (18) into (15) we get
˙ # = u#  ()@(13)]1@(13)N3@(13)  P(N>#>) (19)
where
 =1   =
If  =0 , the income function (11) is said to exhibit constant returns to scale. If A0,w eh a v e
decreasing returns to scale.
From (14) we can express j as a function of # and the eort cost parameter 
j =
1  %  #

if #?1  % (20)
j =0if #  1  %
Substituting (20) and (18) into eq (16), we get
˙ N = v(1  y)N@(13)()@(13)]@(13)  max(0>
1  %  #

)  Q(N>#>) (21)
Remark: The polar case where  =1deserves some mention. Note that if  =1then the local
government has zero tax revenue. Unlike the static case, this does not mean that the local government
will choose k =0 . If it were to set k =0always, then it would be in eect facing a non-renewable-
resource exploitation problem, just like the classic Hotelling model of a mining ﬁrm. The shadow price
would then be positive and would rise at the rate of interest (i.e., Hotelling Rule would apply). But
then ] would be positive, and the helping hand would be positive, by (18).
114 The Case of Constant Returns to Scale
In this section, we analyze the case of constant returns to scale, i.e.,  =0 . Then equation (15) becomes
˙ # = u#  ()@(13)]1@(13)  P(N>#>) (22)
which is independent5 of N, and equation (21) becomes
˙ N = v(1  y)N()@(13)]@(13)  max(0>
1  %  #

)  Q(N>#>) (23)
which is linear in N. Under this case, we consider two sub-cases:  =1and ?1, and in particular, we
search for steady states and their stability properties. (A steady state is a point (Nvv>#vv) such that
P(Nvv>#vv>)=0and Q(Nvv>#vv>)=0 .)
4.1 The sub-case  =1under constant returns to scale
At ﬁrst sight, it might seem that if the central government’s tax share is  =1 , the local government
might not have any incentive to extend the helping hand. Upon reﬂection, however, even though the
local government’s share of o!cial tax revenue is zero, it knows that it can grab only as long as the
capital stock remains positive. By extending the helping hand, it can reduce the rate of decline of
the capital stock, and may even help maintain it at a steady-state level. So even if  =1 > the local
government’s optimal behavior is like that of a manager of a ﬁshery: it is in his interest to conserve the
ﬁsh stock.
Our analysis will rely on the phase diagram method. For the present sub-case, please refer to Figure
1.We begin our analysis by characterizing the curve ˙ # =0in the space (N>#).L e t u s l o o k a t t h e
equation P(N>#>)=0 .
Since we are dealing with the case  =1 , the equation P(N>#>)=0reduces to
u#
T









 (v(1  y))1@(13)#@(13)
¸
=0
5Even though P is independent of case, there is no harm in writing P(N>#>)=








Thus ˙ # =0along the horizontal line # =0and along the horizontal line # = #e.N o t et h a t#e can be
greater than, or smaller than 1  %.C l e a r l y ,i fu is su!ciently small, then #e ? 1  %. Figure 1 depicts
the case where #e ? 1  %.
Recall that with  =0and  =1 , the equation for ˙ # is
˙ # = u#  T[v#(1  y)]
1@(13) (26)
The right-hand side of (26) is strictly concave in #, and is equal to zero at # = #d =0 , and also at
#e A# d. It follows that for #?# d,w eh a v e˙ #?0.I f# 5 (#d>#e),w eh a v e˙ #A0.I f#A# e,w eh a v e
˙ #?0=
Now we characterize the curve ˙ N =0in the space (N>#). Let us look at the equation Q(N>#>)=0 .
To have ˙ N =0 ,w em u s th a v ejA0 when NA0 and #  0. Thus we infer that the curve ˙ N =0must
lie below the line # =1 %. The equation Q(N>#>)=0can be written as
(1  y)1@(13)(v)@(13)N@(13) =
1  #  %
#@(13) (27)
Thus, along this curve, N is a function of #. Let us try to determine the shape of this curve. As
# $ (1  %), N $ 0,a n da s# $ 0, N $4 . We now show that the slope of the curve ˙ N =0is









#@(13)  (1  #  %) 
13#(231)@(13)
#@(13)
which is negative for #?(1  %)= Thus the curve ˙ N =0is downward sloping, and never cuts the
horizontal axis.
It follows that the curve ˙ N =0intersects the curve ˙ # =0exactly once provided that u is small
enough to ensure that #e ? (1  %). This intersection is the steady-state point (Nvv>#e),w h e r e
Nvv =






13From the phase diagram, we know that this steady state is stable in the saddlepoint sense. Thus the
optimal policy is as follows.
If N0 ?N vv then it is optimal to extend the helping hand to build up the stock N until it reaches the
steady state Nvv. Along such a path, the grabing activity may be zero over some initial time interval.
What happens if N0 AN vv? At ﬁrst sight, one might be tempted to think that the unstable branch
of the saddlepoint, i.e., the path with #(w)=#e for ever, and with N rising without bound, might be
optimal. But upon reﬂection, this is not an optimal path, because along such a path, the pay-o to the
local government is (1  )j  (1@)j2  k where j is constant over time (j =( 1 %  #e)@)w h i l e
k is increasing over time. Clearly, it would be better to follow the stable branch of the saddlepoint,
and set jA(1  %  #e)@ to ensure that N falls from N0 to Nvv,a n do n c eNvv is reached, choose
j =( 1 %  #e)@ so as to stay at the steady state. In fact, it can be veriﬁed that the path of





Figure 1 corresponds to the case where #e ? 1  % (which holds if the discount rate u is low, i.e., if
the local government is patient).If the rate of interest u is high, i.e., the local government is impatient,
then #e exceeds 1 %, and it follows that there will not exist any steady state.Then the optimal policy
i st or u nt h es t o c kd o w nt oz e r o .
Proposition D1: Under constant returns to scale ( =0 ), if the tax share of the central government
is 100% ( =1 ) , the optimal policy for the local government depends on the magnitude of the rate of
discount u.





 1  % (28)
then there does not exist any interior steady state. The optimal policy for the local government is to let
the capital stock fall to zero. Along such path, the grabing activity j(w) is positive and decreasing over
time (in much the same way as the extraction of an exhaustible resource), while the hepling activity k(w)
is always positive, until the stock is exhausted. If the condition (28) holds with equality, then the point
(N>#)=( 0 >1  %) is a steady state, and the capital stock tends to zero as time tends to inﬁnity.
(b) If u is low, so that inequality (28) is reversed, then there is an interior steady state (Nvv>#e) A
(0>0), with the saddlepoint property.If the initial stock N0 is below the steady state level Nvv,i ti s
optimal to extend the helping hand to build up the stock N until it reaches the steady state Nvv.A l o n g
14such a path, the grabbing activity may be zero over some initial time interval. If N0 AN vv,t h e n
grabbing dominates helping, and the stock will fall toward Nvv.
4.2 The sub-case ?1 under constant returns to scale
In this sub-case, the local government has positive tax revenue as well as extortion revenue. The phase









](#>)=y(1  )+#v(1  y)
Under constant returns to scale,  =0 , equation (29) becomes
u
T
#  [y(1  )+#v(1  y)]
1@(13) =0 (30)
Since the left-hand side of equation (30) is a concave function of #, this equation has at most two real
roots, which we denote by #1 and #2  #1. For example, suppose  =1 @2> then
u
T
#  (y(1  )+#v(1  y))2 =0
i.e.,
(1  y)2v2#2 +
·




# + y2(1  )2 =0
This equation has two roots (both real, or both complex):
#1 =
u
T  2vy(1  y)(1  ) 
s

2(1  y)2v2 (31)
#2 =
u
T  2vy(1  y)(1  )+
s





T2 [u  4Tvy(1  y)(1  )] (33)
Consider the following Assumption:
Assumption 1: u  4Tvy(1  y)(1  )  0=
If Assumption 1 is satisﬁed, we have   0, thus we have two real roots. Note that both roots are
positive. (This is because the product of the roots equals y2(1  )2 and the sum of the roots equals
#1 + #2 =
u
T  2vy(1  y)(1  )
2(1  y)2v2
15which is positive, given Assumption 1.)
Recall that with  =0and ?1, the equation for ˙ # is
˙ # = P(N>#>)=u#  T[y(1  )+v#(1  y)]
1@(13) (34)
T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 3 4 )i sc o n c a v ei n#. It follows that for #?# 1,w eh a v e ˙ #?0.I f# 5 (#1>#2),
we have ˙ #A0.I f#A# 2,w eh a v e ˙ #?0=
In the space (N>#), the line # = #1 and the line # = #2 divide the ﬁrst quadrant {(N>#):N  0 and #  0}
into three regions. In the region D, deﬁned as the set of points (N>#) with N  0 and #A# 2,w e
have P(N>#>) ? 0 hence ˙ #?0.I nt h er e g i o nF, deﬁned as the set of points (N>#) with N  0 and
#?# 1,w ea l s oh a v eP(N>#>) ? 0 hence ˙ #?0. In the region E deﬁned as the set of points (N>#)
with N  0 and # 5 (#1>#2) (between the line # = #1 and the line # = #2), we have ˙ #A0. In other
words
P(N>#>) A 0 in region E
P(N>#>) ? 0 in regions D and F=
Turning now to the curve ˙ N =0i.e., Q(N>#>)=0 ,w en o t et h a t ,f o r#?1%, this equation can
be written as
N@(13) =
1  %  #
v(1  y)()@(13) [y(1  )+#v(1  y)]
@(13) (35)
This curve has a negative slope in the space (N>#). Along this curve, as # $ 1  %,w eh a v eN $ 0.
The curve cuts the horizontal axis at a ﬁnite value of N. To see this, observe that as # $ 0, N tends












Below it, ˙ N?0.
We now determine the steady-state points. Please refer to Figures 2 and 3. In Figure 2, u is small




1  %  #2





1  %  #1




It is easy to see that the steady-state point (N2>#2) is stable in the saddlepoint sense. The other
steady state point, (N1>#1), is unstable. This is conﬁrmed by linearization of the dynamic system
around a steady state.
In Figure 3, u is so high that #2 A 1  %, and thus there is only one steady state point.
Proposition D2:A s s u m e?1> and constant returns to scale ( =0 ) = If u is small enough so
that #2 ? 1  %, then there exists two interior steady states. The one with a smaller steady-state stock
(and a higher shadow price) is stable in the saddlepoint sense. The other steady state is unstable. If u
i sl a r g ee n o u g hs ot h a t#2 A 1 %, then there exists only one interior steady state, and it is completely
unstable.
Remark: The above analysis tells us the following things about the optimal policy:
(a) if there are two steady states (as in Figure 2), and if N0 ?N 1, we simply take the stable branch
of the saddlepoint and approach the steady state point (N2>#2).
(b) if there is only one steady state (as in Figure 3), and if N0 ?N 1> we run the stock down to zero
(appoaching the point (N>#)=( 0 >1  %).
(c) if N0 happens to be equal to N1, then the optimal policy is to set #0 = #1 and thus the system
will remain at the unstable steady state point (N1>#1) for ever.
What is not obvious, however, is what one should do if N0 is greater than N1? There is no path
that leads to an interior steady state, starting at N0 AN 1. One is tempted to conjecture that, for
any N0 AN 1> the optimal policy is to choose #0 = #1 so that #(w)=#1 for ever, and let the capital





Let us check to see if condition (37) is satisﬁed along the path of unbounded growth of the capital
stock, with #(w)=#1 f o re v e r .L e tu st a k et h ec a s ew h e r e =  =1 @2. Under assumption 1, we have
two real roots #2 and #1.Using (31), we get
#1 =
2u  vy(1  y)(1  ) 
p
4u(u  vy(1  y)(1  ))
(1  y)2v2 (38)
Let
e  vy(1  y)(1  )
17then
(1  y)2v2#1 =2 u  e 
p
4u(u  e) A 2u  e 
p
(2u  e)2 =0 (39)












N1@2 [y(1  )+#v(1  y)] (40)




= v(1  y)k1@2N1@2 
1  #  %

(41)




v(1  y)N [y(1  )+#v(1  y)] 
1  #  %

(42)
Setting # = #1 in (42), we see that ˙ N =0i fa n do n l yi fN = N1,w h e r e
N1 =
2(1  #1  %)
v(1  y)[y(1  )+#1v(1  y)]
(43)






v(1  y)[y(1  )+#1v(1  y)]  
The transversality condition (37) is satisﬁed i u + ?0,i . e .i 
(1  y)2v2#1 ? 2u  vy(1  y)(1  )=2 u  e
This condition is satisﬁed, in view of (39).
Thus we have established the following proposition:
Proposition D3: Let (N1>#1) denote the unstable steady state. Then, if N0 AN 1, the optimal
policy is to set #(w)=#1 and let N(w) grow without bound. This path satisﬁes all the necessary
conditions, and the transversality condition, and is therefore optimal6. Along the optimal path, grabbing
is a constant, and local government tax revenue, net of expenditure on helping, is a constant proportion
of income, which grows without bound.
6Su!ciency is ensured by the concavity of the Hamiltonian with respect to the variables (N>k>j)
185 Implications: threshold levels of corruption and tax share
The analysis in the preceeding section indicates that, for any intitial level of capital stock, N0,t h e r ei s
a threshold level of corruption and a threshold level of central government tax share, below which the
economy will grow without bound, and above which the economy will stagnate. As we have seen, if
N0 AN 1, the economy will grow without bound, and corruption (as measured by the ratio j@\,i . e . ,
the proportion of income that is grabbed by government o!cials) will fall steadily. This critical level
N1 is a function of the parameters %> and .I ti sn o td i !cult to show that N1 is increasing in  and
decreasing in % and . To prove this, consider equations (38) and (43). From equation (38), we see that
#1 is dependent on  and independent of % and .D i erentiating (38)> we get
(1  y)2v2g#1
g





u(u  vy(1  y)(1  ))
#
? 0 (44)
where the inequality follows from u?1=




[y(1  )+( 1 %)v(1  y)]
g#1
g + y(1  #1  %)
1
2v(1  y)[y(1  )+#1v(1  y)]
2 A 0




2(1  #1  %)32
v(1  y)[y(1  )+#1v(1  y)]
? 0




2(1  #1  %)
v(1  y)[y(1  )+#1v(1  y)]
? 0
It follows that, given the initial capital stock level N0, a change in the parameter  can have
qualitatively signiﬁcant eects on the course of development of the economy. Suppose that initially 
is su!ciently low, so that N1(>%>) ?N 0. Then the local economy is due to embark on an expansion
path with ever-rising capital and income. But if there is a policy shift by the central government that
results in a higher  (say from O to K A O) such that N1(K>%>) AN 0, then the local economy will
stagnate: the capital stock falls and converges to a low-level steady state.
Similarly, the parameters % and  indicate how di!cult it is to carry out grabbing activities. An
increase in % or  represents an increase in the level of transparency of governance at the local government
level. An increase in transparency will reduce N1 below N0 thus enabling the economy to achieve
perpetual growth.
19Proposition D4: (i) Given any initial capital stock, there exists a corresponding threshold level of
central government tax share, below which the economy will achieve perpetual growth, and above which
the economy will stagnate.
(ii) Given any initial capital stock, there exists a corresponding threshold level of transparency of
governance, above which the economy will achieve perpetual growth, and below which the economy will
stagnate.
6 The Case of Decreasing Returns to Scale
We now consider the case A0
6.1 The sub-case  =1under decreasing returns to scale
We begin our analysis of this sub-case by characterizing the curve ˙ # =0in the space (N>#).C o n s i d e r
Figure 4. Let us look at the equation P(N>#>)=0 . Since we are dealing with the case  =1 ,t h a t
equation is reduced to
u#
T









N = # (v(1  y))




we infer that ˙ #A0 to the right of the curve ˙ # =0and ˙ #?0 to its left.
Now we try to characterize the curve ˙ N =0in the space (N>#). Let us look at the equation
Q(N>#>)=0 .T oh a v e ˙ N =0 ,w em u s th a v ejA0 when NA0 and #  0.T h u sw ei n f e rt h a tt h e
curve ˙ N =0must lie below the line # =1 %. The equation Q(N>#>)=0can be written as
(1  y)1@(13)(v)@(13)N@(13) =
1  #  %
#@(13) (45)
20Thus, along this curve, N is a function of #. Let us try to determine the shape of this curve. As
# $ (1%), N $ 0,a n da s# $ 0, N $4 . We now show that the curve N =0has a negative slope.









#@(13)  (1  #  %) 
13#(231)@(13)
#@(13) (46)
which is negative for #?(1  %)= Thus we can infer from (45) and (46) that the curve ˙ N =0is
downward sloping, and never cuts the horizontal axis.
It follows that the curve ˙ N =0intersects the curve ˙ # =0exactly once given that A0.T h i s
intersection is the steady-state point (Nvv>#vv). From the phase diagram (Figure 4), we know that this
steady state is stable in the saddlepoint sense.
Proposition D5: Assume  =1 . Under decreasing returns to scale, regardless of the magnitude of
the interest rate, there exists a unique interior steady state point (Nvv>#vv). This unique steady state
has the saddlepoint property. Starting from any N0 A 0, the optimal path is the stablebranch of the
saddlepoint, leading to the interior steady state. For N0 ?N vv, grabbing activities begin at a low level
(possibly zero), and intensify as the capital stock grows toward Nvv.F o rN0 AN vv, grabbing activities
begin at a high level, and diminish as the capital stock falls towards Nvv=
Remark: Compare Figure 4 with Figure 1. The qualitative properties of the respective optimal
paths are very similar. This is not surprising, because in both situations the tax share of the central
government is 100 per cent.
6.2 The sub-case ?1 under decreasing returns to scale
Figure 5 is the phase diagram for this sub-case. Equation (29) gives us the curve ˙ # =0 , and along this









#2@(13) [v(1  y)#  y(1  )(1  y)]
Deﬁne
b # =
y(1  )(1  y)
v(1  y)
Along the curve ˙ # =0 ,w eh a v eN as a decreasing function of # for # 5 (0> b #) and N as an increasing
function of # for #Ab #.I n t h es p a c e(N>#),t h ec u r v e˙ # =0has the shape of the letter F.T ot h e
21right of this curve, we have ˙ #A0> because CP@CN A 0. At the turning point of the letter F -shaped
curve, we have
# = b # =
y(1  )(1  y)
v(1  y)










Now consider the curve ˙ N =0 .W en o t et h a t ,f o r#?1  %, this equation can be written as
N@(13) =
1  %  #
v(1  y)()@(13) [y(1  )+#v(1  y)]
@(13) (48)
This curve has a negative slope in the space (N>#). Along this curve, as # $ 1%,w eh a v eN $ 0.
The curve cuts the horizontal axis at a ﬁnite value of N. To see this, observe that as # $ 0, N tends




v(1  y)()@(13) (y(1  ))
@(13)
#(13)@





Below it, ˙ N?0.
We now determine the steady-state points. Since the curve ˙ # =0has the F shape, and the curve
˙ N =0is downward sloping, there is the possibility of several intersections.
Proposition 6: Assume ?1 and A0 (decreasing returns to scale). There may exist several
steady states. The one with the smallest capital stock is stable in the saddlepoint sense. It is also
possible that there does not exist any interior steady state (for example, if b N?e N). In the latter case,
the optimal path is to run down the stock to zero in ﬁnite time.
Remark: In Figure 5, we show two steady-state points, (N1>#1) and (N2>#2).T h ep o i n t(N2>#2)
is stable in the saddlepoint sense. For all N0 5 (0>N 1), the optimal policy is to follow the stable branch
of the saddlepoint and approach (N2>#2) asymptotically. If N0 = N1, it is optimal to stay at N1 for
ever. If N0 AN 1 it seems that the optimal policy is to let N grow for ever (in much the same way as
the constant path #(w)=#1 in Figure 2.)
227 Local stability analysis by linearization
In the preceding section, we relied on the phase-diagram approach in our analysis of stability. We
now compliment that analysis by the method of linearization of the dynamic system around an interior
steady state. This method also permits comparative dynamics (across steady states, as parameters of
the system change).
7.1 Local stability analysis


























This system has two chracteristic roots, 1 and 2. The sum of the roots is
1 + 2 = uA0
and the product is
12 = (KN#)2 + uKN# + K##KNN = KN#(u  KN#)+K##KNN
If the product 12 is negative, we have saddlepoint stability (i.e., one root has negative real part, and
the other has positive real part). If the product is positive, the steady state is unstable. Now it is clear
that K## = Q# A 0 and KNN = PN =0 . From (19) we have
KN# A 0
Let us apply this analysis to the steady-state points (N1>#1) and (N2>#2) of the section on constant
returns to scale, with ?1. At the steady state (N2>#2) we have uKN# ? 0,h e n c e12 ? 0 thus it
is stable in the saddlepoint sense. At the steady state (N1>#1) we have u  KN# A 0, hence 12 A 0
thus it is unstable.
237.2 Comparative dynamics
We now study how an increase in the parameter  aects the position of the stable steady state.
At the steady state, we have
Q(Nvv>#vv>>)=0
P(Nvv>#vv>)=0
To see how the steady state changes with an increase in ,w ed i erentiate the system totally:
QNgNvv + Q#g#vv + Qg =0
PNgNvv + P#g#vv + Pg =0
























[PQN  QP#] (49)
where, at the steady state,
 = QNP#  PNQ# = 12 ? 0
Let us apply this to the (saddlepoint stable) steady-state point (N2>#2) of the section on constant
returns to scale, with ?1. The numerator of the right-hand side of (49) can be computed as follows.












P# = u  (1  y)]
Thus







This establishes proposition D7 below.
Proposition D7: Concerning the steady state that is stable in the saddlepoint sense, an increase
in  (the tax share of the central government) will lead to a fall in the steady-state capital stock, and a
rise in the steady-state shadow price #=
248 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that a corrupt local government may have long term interest in the health of the local
economy. Thus its activities consist of helping as well as grabbing. Depending on the initial level of the
capital stock being higher or lower than a certain threshold level, the outcome for the local economy
may be perpetual growth at a positive rate (as in the DN model in the endogenous growth literature),
or stagnation (a low level poverty trap). An important property of our results is that the threshold
level of capital is a decreasing function of the central government tax share. Thus, the greater is the
central government tax share, the more likely is the stagnation outcome. Another way of putting this
is: given an initial capital stock N0, there is a threshold level of central government tax share, beyond
which the economy will become stagnated, and below which perpetual growth will be achieved.
We also showed that the threshold level of capital is a decreasing function of the transparency of
local governance (i.e., a decreasing function of the parameters % and  that reﬂect the di!culty of hiding
extortion). Thus any increase in transparency will increase the likelihood that the economy can take
o.
The model can be extended in several directions. First, the central government’s choice of the tax
rate and of its revenue share could be explicitly modelled. This would lead to a study of interesting
interactions between the central government and the local government. Second, one could suppose
that capital is mobile across several local regions, and thus there would be competition among various
local governments. These extensions would involve an analysis of dierential games7,p o s s i b l yw i t ha
hierarchical structures. Finally, political uncertainty about the possibility of losing o!ce can be added
to the model, along the lines of Long (1975) and Konrad et al. (1994).
7For some examples of dierential games in economics, see Benchekroun and Long (1998, 2002). For a comprehensive
treatment of dierential games, including those with a hierarchical structures, see Docker et al. (2000).
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